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---------------------- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATEMENTS ------------------------
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[A] Initiation, 2001/11/13 - 2001/01/09

[B] Camp X-Ray activated, Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, 2002/01/10 - 2001/02/06

[C] Revision of GC Policies, 2002/02/07 - 2001/03/20

[D] Military Commision Order No. 1, 2002/03/21 - date

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[A] Initiation, 2001/11/13 - 2001/01/09
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November 30, 2001

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - SECRETARY RUMSFELD (excerpt)

Q: Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you, is the United States now seeking to get
custody of Ahmed Rahman and other al Qaeda captives of opposition groups, to put
them on U.S. military trial?

Rumsfeld: Without getting into individual names, the United States has, from the
beginning, and continues to seek out opportunities to interview, interrogate,
question -- whatever the proper word may be -- al Qaeda and senior Taliban
leaders who are detained, captured, imprisoned -- whatever the definition may be
-- by the forces that have been opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Q: And how about taking custody of --

Rumsfeld: We have not yet taken custody of anyone.

Q: But would this interrogation, these questions, lead to possible charges from
the United States, and military trials? Has that been worked out?

Rumsfeld: Well, until the interrogations are complete and until one knows what
there is to know about various individuals, one does not know which basket to
put them in. And there are a variety of options available, obviously.

Q: And just one brief follow-up, sir. Has a decision been made --

Rumsfeld: I want everyone to understand, those, in fact, ARE follow-ups.
(laughter)

!!! Q: Has a decision been made to go ahead with military trials? Has the
president given the option on whether or not to conduct these trials, or simply
how to do it?

Rumsfeld: Well, I think that the matter is very clear. The president has issued
a military order with respect to military commissions, and it is there. It has
been discussed by the White House counsel, who was involved in its preparation.
It's been discussed by the attorney general of the United States. It's been
discussed by the vice president. It's been discussed by the president.

My responsibility -- and no individual has been turned over, assigned to me for
that purpose. It is my responsibility and I have undertaken it to begin that
process of thinking through exactly what might be the appropriate criteria, what
might be the various ways of dealing with such a tribunal or commission, how --
where one might -- were it to happen, where it might occur. And we have elevated
a series of issues that we're discussing with thoughtful people around the
country who have experience in these matters and a good deal to contribute. And
at that point where we end up being assigned an individual by the president,
obviously we would hope that we would have completed this work and been able to
then deal with it appropriately. But all I can say by way of elaboration is that
we're doing it with a great deal of care and thought and consideration because
it's an important issue.

(cross talk)

Q: A legitimate follow-up?

Q: Mr. Secretary, the way you --

Rumsfeld: I want to see a hand go up and someone say, "An illegitimate follow-
up." (laughter) That will be the day.

Q: Your explanation today seems to be in sharp contrast to what the Justice
Department is doing. The Justice Department rounded up more than 500 people, and
it is now in the process of sorting them out. You say that what you're doing or
what the U.S. military is doing is sorting them out and then we'll decide who
you should take into your custody. Is there a reluctance --

Rumsfeld: No, no, no, no. That's a misunderstanding of the situation. First of
all, the Department of Justice has a totally different set of issues than does
the military. We are -- the people that are being dealt with in Afghanistan are
being dealt with almost exclusively by the forces that have been opposing the
Taliban, not by the United States of America. These aren't people that we've
arrested, as such. These are not people that we have custody of, as such. They
are people that the opposition forces have taken prisoner, for one reason or
another, and who have surrendered or been imprisoned. So I think to even begin
to compare them is not a good idea.

Second, if one thinks about it, let's say that there were to be a senior person
that -- and we ended up interrogating, and we ended up saying to the opposition
forces that we would like to take custody of this individual, first of all, it's
up to the people who have custody to determine if they want to transfer custody.
And then one would have to decide what one would do with it, that person. And it
may be something that would be handled by the Department of Defense totally
apart from the military commission -- military order proposing the possibility
of commissions by the Defense Department. It may be handled in any number of
other ways. It could also be handled by another agency of government. I could
end up being handled by the Department of Justice.

So I think that it is not a simple matter. It is a matter that requires a good
deal of thought and attention, and we are giving it that serious thought and
attention.

Yeah.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if I could follow up. I think the majority of American people
might think it would be a simple matter if we identify a senior Taliban or al
Qaeda official, why don't we just get our hands on that person and take him into
our custody.

Rumsfeld: Well, we have not identified such a person yet.

Q: Are you saying then that no --

Rumsfeld: I can assure you, we would have an interest if we did.

Q: Are you saying that no one that these forces have taken, captured or won the
surrender of is of a level that they would be a candidate for trial?

Rumsfeld: I am saying that as of this moment, to my knowledge, we have not taken
custody.

Q: But they have someone that we haven't taken custody of, or they don't have
anybody of that level right now?

Rumsfeld: They have thousands of people in a variety of locations spread across
Afghanistan.

They are people who, for the most part, don't walk up and volunteer their names
and identification numbers with a sample of DNA. What they do is they blend into
the other prisoners. And it requires people going into a prison -- which is
where the danger occurs, and where the American was killed -- going into a
prison, interrogating somebody, trying to find out who the people are, sorting
them, and deciding what you're going to do with them. These are thousands of
human beings. It's a messy business.

Q: So they might have a big fish, but we don't -- we, or they, don't know yet?
Or they might not know --

Rumsfeld: Anything's possible.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said --

Rumsfeld: I started over here.

Q: I hope you consider this a legitimate follow-up regarding the tribunal --

Rumsfeld: The only legitimate follow-up is a follow-up on a question that you've
asked yourself, I think. Isn't that the rule? (laughs)

Q: That sounds like a new rule! (laughs)

Q: There will be -- there will be a follow-up of questionable legitimacy coming.
But anyway -- (laughter)

But anyway -- but to continue with the discussion about military tribunals and
the deliberations which are occurring, I'm wondering if you agree that they're
very time-sensitive, and if you have a target date in mind when you will have
decided what to do?

And secondly, as part of that same question, will you announce what the
procedures are going to be?

Rumsfeld: Until we have sorted -- first of all, I don't think there will be a
single set of procedures. I think it may vary, depending on individuals. Until
somebody -- namely, the president of the United States -- designates somebody as
fitting within his military order and assigning them to me, I wouldn't have the
vaguest idea as to how -- what one might do with a person, because you don't
know the fact pattern, as yet.

Therefore, what we will do is we will proceed in a responsible way to sort
through these questions hypothetically, and begin to prepare the kinds of
information and background information that will be helpful to us at that point
where the president, if he decides to assign someone here, actually does so.

Yes?

Q: You said that it would be up to the groups who held detainees to decide
themselves whether or not to turn them over to the United States. My question
is, does that include Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, if in fact they become
detainees held by groups inside Afghanistan? Is it up to those groups to decide
if they turn those two individuals over to the United States? Would you take
them against the will of those that are holding them?

Rumsfeld: Well, one would hope one would not have to do it against their will.

Q: But you've laid down a policy, haven't you?

Rumsfeld: We have a relationship with all of these elements on the ground. We
have provided them food. We've provided them ammunition. We've provided air
support. We've provided winter clothing. We've worked with them closely. We have
troops embedded in their forces and have been assisting with overhead targeting
and resupply of ammunition. It's a relationship. Possession has a certain
virtue. It gives you the ability to do or not do something with something if you
have it, physically.

Now, let there be no doubt, we would want all, each, every single senior Taliban
leader. We would want al Qaeda people not to be set free. We would want them not
released into other countries where they can continue to perpetrate terrorist
acts. And we would do everything reasonable to see that we had access to those
people, first to interrogate them and find out who they are, and second if they
are people that we believe we want, to actually get physical custody over them.

Q: Well, what instructions are being given to the U.S. military personnel, then,
who will be conducting interrogations about the procedures for getting custody
of these people there? What's the rule, here? How does that happen?

Rumsfeld: Well, I don't know that I can describe the instructions in great
detail. I don't think we have time. But they are being told what we want. They
are -- they know what we want. There are not ambiguities with respect to it. And
if you're suggesting that we would interrogate somebody that was a al Qaeda or
Taliban leader and that the interrogators would not know what to do with them or
what we would want to do with them, that would be mistaken.

Q: Do they have the authority to take custody of them from those who are holding
them?

Rumsfeld: You can be certain that in the event we find someone we want, that we
will have the authority to receive them from those that actually currently have
custody of them.

* * *


Sunday, December 2, 2001

SECRETARY RUMSFELD INTERVIEW WITH NBC MEET THE PRESS (excerpt)

Russert: Military tribunals. The president has given an order as commander-in-
chief that military tribunals be established, if need be. What does that mean to
you?

Rumsfeld: It means that the president, as was the case with George Washington,
during the Civil War with Abraham Lincoln, and with Franklin Roosevelt during
World War II, has said that it may that we need that option. And as a result, he
has put in place and begun the work to develop the kinds of procedures and
approaches that would be appropriate so that in the event that we need to have a
military commission, that we would be in a place to detain a person and take
control over a person that he designates. He has not designated anyone to be
tried by a military commission. He may. He may not, but he may. And if he does,
he wanted to get the military order out designating the secretary of Defense as
the person responsible so that that work could begin.

I must say I've been interested in the press discussion and media discussion on
the subject. I think it's been generally useful. It's elevated a lot of issues
that are important and need to be considered. Some of it's been a little shrill
given the fact that nobody's been designated yet to be tried by a military
commission. But overall, those of us in the Department of Defense have found it
useful, and we are working very hard with some very smart people all across the
country, out of government, to try to make sure that we do this in the event it
happens in a very measured, balanced, thoughtful way that reflects our country's
values and approaches.

Russert: Let me go back to the World Trade Center in 1993 and show you some
video of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. Here he is on the screen. You can see him. He
was convicted for blowing up the Trade Center in '93. His son has now been taken
into custody in Afghanistan. Is his son the kind of person that would go before
a military tribunal?

Rumsfeld: Until we have developed the information that I need to make sensible
judgments on something as important as this, I've decided not to opine on things
like that. And second, I would say that that's a decision for the president. He
will be the one who will designate what individuals will be assigned to the
Department of Defense to take control over and then deal with respect to
military commissions.

Russert: As you have mentioned, there's a lot of discussion about this issue.
Terry Golway in the New York Observer had this to say: "If a terrorist is
convicted by a military tribunal of something less than a capital crime, for
example attempted murder or possession of a weapon, will the subsequent sentence
be served on a special military facility? If so, we can expect convicted al
Qaeda operatives to demand recognition as prisoners of war."

Have you thought that through? Where will they serve their time? Will they be
prisoners of war?

Rumsfeld: We have thought through a good deal of it, and we're in the process of
discussing some preliminary thoughts with, as I say, some truly outstanding
legal advisers from around the country, out of government, people whose judgment
we respect. And we're not prepared at the moment to draw conclusions. And we
will be at some point in the future.

Russert: There is some downside, as you know. This headline caught it:
"Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror Suspects to the United States." Even though
they've arrested some since September 11th because the continent's harsh view of
the U.S. legal system, particularly President Bush's plan for secret military
tribunals, is creating resistance to possible extradition of suspects to the
United States. So you have countries arresting people, but they're saying we're
not sending them to the United States because we don't have faith in military
tribunals.

Rumsfeld: Well, first of all, we don't know that that's true. That's a report
that may or may not have substance under it. If it is true, it may be true in a
very modest situation and not broadly true. Third, we have known for years that
there's some differences in Europe with respects to views as to capital
punishment. And that's fair enough. They have their countries; we have ours.
They can make their judgment.

I would suggest that I think that'll not prove to be much of an impediment.

Russert: But the United States has been critical of Peru and Egypt and China for
military tribunals. If a United States citizen was arrested as a suspected
terrorist in China, would you feel comfortable with that American going before a
military tribunal in China?

Rumsfeld: If one looked down from Mars and looked at the countries of the world
and said if you had someone in whom you had an interest, where would you prefer
-- of all the countries on the face of the earth, where would you prefer that
that individual be tried in a military commission, I would think an overwhelming
number of the people in the world would prefer it be done in the United States.
We have a reputation for being fair and balanced and measured in what we do.

Russert: But other countries may react to that by creating their own military
tribunals for American citizens.

Rumsfeld: Other countries already have military tribunals.

Russert: And we've criticized them for it.

Rumsfeld: And in cases where we've disagreed with how they've been handled, we
have indeed, and we will in the future. And I'm sure that people will criticize
us if we behave in a way that they, in their measured judgment, feel we've acted
improperly. But I don't think we've going to act improperly, Tim.

* * *


December 4, 2001

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND GEN. MYERS (excerpts)

Q: Mr. Secretary -- (off mike) -- follow up, please. You said earlier that that
the American that was being held or controlled by U.S. sources to be certain
that he'll be given every right that he has. Do you mean as an American citizen
or as a Taliban enemy soldier being held captive? What do you mean by "every
right that he deserves"?

Rumsfeld: Well, I guess one would go to the individual and say: Whatever it is
decided that any individual -- this or another -- merits by way of rights, they
will get.

Q: Quick follow-up on that, Mr. Secretary. Under the tribunals, he cannot be
tried if he is an American citizen. Is that correct?

Rumsfeld: I do not recall exactly what the military order establishing the
commissions said, but my impression, from all the meetings I have had, is, that
is not intended for Americans. Whether it's explicit in there or not, I've
forgotten.

(...)

Q: Mr. Secretary, some --

Rumsfeld: We'll make this the last question.

Q: Some Afghan opposition leaders have made statements indicating that they have
uncertainty about what they would do if they captured senior al Qaeda and
Taliban, and some hesitancy about whether they would turn them over. If they
were, in fact, to refuse to turn them over, wouldn't that put them in the same
position that the Taliban was vis-a-vis the United States, and therefore, you'd
be really in conflict -- potentially military conflict -- with such a group?

Rumsfeld: I don't know that I'd come to quite the conclusion you have -- that it
would put them in exactly the same position. But the fact is, the cold, hard
fact is that we are there for several reasons. We are there to capture or kill
the al Qaeda and foreign invaders in Afghanistan who are terrorists; and we are
there to change the Taliban leadership and change the government of Afghanistan;
and third, to create a country -- contribute to a country that is no longer
harboring terrorists.

Everyone we are assisting, whether it's with air support or money or
humanitarian assistance or winter clothing or ammunition or food -- well, you
name it, everyone that we are assisting knows precisely why they're -- we're
there. And they are being told in no uncertain terms why we are there. And to
the extent one or more of them were, for whatever reason, to make a decision
that they wanted to harbor or assist a -- al Qaeda leadership or Taliban
leadership, that would run directly counter to our interests and our objectives
and our goals in that country, obviously, our relationship with them would
change. (laughter)

Q: See you tomorrow, Mr. Secretary!

* * *


December 6, 2001

STAKEOUT ON CAPITOL HILL WITH SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND GEN. PACE (excerpt)

Q: Mr. Secretary, what (inaudible) to have (inaudible) rules for a possible
military tribunal? What do you say to those on the Hill who are (inaudible)
tribunals may not be fair?

Rumsfeld: I do not know when we'll have the procedures fully developed for these
so-called military commissions or tribunals. The president issued a military
order designating the secretary of defense to be prepared to conduct, to see
that military commissions are conducted in the event he assigns someone to the
department. No one has been assigned to the department for that purpose. We are
approaching it in a very careful, measured way, consulting thoughtful people on
the subject who have experience in these areas. We're considering the various
options with respect to the significant issues that obviously come to light. And
there's no doubt in my mind that at that point, if and when we are assigned
somebody, that we'll be prepared to do it in a careful and measured way that
will be respectful of American values.

* * *


December 7, 2001

SECRETARY RUMSFELD INTERVIEW WITH THE WASHINGTON POST (excerpt)

Q: Also, I understand that you and Vice President Cheney devised the idea of
military tribunals together and then took this to the White House counsel,
Gonzales, and only subsequently was it actually brought over to Attorney General
Ashcroft. Is that correct?

Rumsfeld: I think not. I don't know quite how it all happened, but I know I came
quite late. My understanding is that Attorney General Ashcroft was in much of
the process.

Q: Before you?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I'm sure. I shouldn't say anything, but I think so. I've been
rather busy, and I am not a lawyer. And I tend to not look for opportunities to
get into things that I don't know an awful lot about.

[Remainder of interview deleted by mutual agreement.]

* * *


December 11, 2001

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND GEN. MYERS (excerpts)

Introductory Remarks by Rumsfeld:

(...)

So as the campaign proceeds, we can expect that more of the enemy forces will be
detained. We want to bring more transparency as to how we handle detainees in
this war. We want to fashion a system that is as open as possible so that the
American people can have a good comfort level about the process itself.

Whether we hold these detainees in Afghanistan, as we may in some cases; put
them aboard ship at sea, as we may in some cases; return to their countries of
origin for punishment, as we may in some cases; or whether we bring some back to
the United States, which we may well do, we will in every case attempt to do it
in the right way. And we're working with knowledgeable people in and out of
government to make sure that we handle detainees properly and in a manner that
reflects our country's values, but also in a manner that reflects the
seriousness of their situation and of our situation.

(...)

Q: Sir, moving to the discussion a moment ago about detainees, you initiated the
comment that you, quote, "want a system as open as possible." You're in the
process, as you've told us several times, of developing a tribunal proposal. Is
your operating premise that these would not be held in secret, that they would
be open to the public to watch, in some -- one way or the other?

Rumsfeld: No, I don't have an operating premise that goes to that. And my guess
is, it would be handled differently with respect to different individuals, just
as we know that various procedures historically have been handled differently
with different individuals. What we do try to do is take the early period to do
-- engage in interrogation, with -- for the intelligence-gathering purpose, as
opposed to law enforcement purposes or anything like that, to find out
everything we can, so that we can protect the lives of Americans, both on the
battlefield as well as here at home and our deployed forces. And that is the
first step that takes place.

Q: Sir, a follow-up, if I could, and a semi-follow-up. (Laughter.) Having -- if
I get away with this -- (laughs) --

Rumsfeld: We'll have a vote -- (laughter) -- on how well it fits into that
category.

Q: The question that has been raised about if the European nations, particularly
Britain, would be the ones who ended up with custody of an al Qaeda leader,
Osama bin Laden or other, that there might be a problem with their turning him
over to the United States. Is --

Rumsfeld: There won't be.

Q: There will not be?

Rumsfeld: There will not be. Either a country will indicate that they will turn
them over to us, quite apart from whether or not their laws may be different
with respect to the death penalty, or they will be positioned in places where
they're unlikely to come in contact with someone that we would like to have
control over. (Scattered laughter.)

Yes?

Q: If I could just follow up --

(Cross talk.)

Rumsfeld: (Chuckles.)

Q: Talk about the possibility of taking the Taliban fighters on Navy ships or
sending them back to their countries of origin you mentioned.

Rumsfeld: Well, al Qaeda are, for the most part, the non-Afghan people. They
would be the ones that would more likely go back to their countries of origin.
Taliban in large number are Afghans, and their country of origin is obviously
Afghanistan.

Q: Well what about the foreign Taliban, what will be done with them?

Rumsfeld: I think it's a definitional issue. Most of the foreigners are
characterized and catalogued and grouped as al Qaeda. The non-Afghan people in
their -- the al Qaeda process tends to group them in clusters of organizations
that they call al Qaeda, not Taliban. So I guess maybe it's better not to use
the words at all. But the people who don't live -- who are not from Afghanistan
in some instances, conceivably, could be sent back to their countries of origin,
if the countries would like them and if the country had views that are not
terribly different from ours about the fact that what they've been engaged in is
not a good thing for the world.

Q: Do the Marines hope to corral some of these down at Camp Rhino at all? Do you
have a sense -- are they going to actually apprehend any of the al Qaeda or
Taliban fighters there?

Rumsfeld: We -- there are several ways it can happen. One way is that they can
be kept where they're captured, or where they surrender, for a period of
interrogation. That could be anywhere. It could be with any one of the various
opposition forces, it could be with U.S. forces in control of them, I guess, is
the proper word. Then they could be moved to some other location that is more
appropriate for managing the control over an enemy individual or group of
individuals. And that could be an opposition force headquarters, it could be
Camp Rhino, which is about the only place besides maybe Bagram where we have
enough people that we could manage that ourselves without having it terribly
interfere with our other responsibilities.

Q: Mr. Secretary, to follow on that: How confident are you sending some of these
fighters back to their home country of origin that the justice system there will
satisfy what we expect?

Rumsfeld: We wouldn't send them back if we didn't have a high degree of
confidence.

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Q: Every country, you're satisfied, you're going to get that type level of --

Rumsfeld: No! We would only send them back to a country where we felt that the
country had a similar attitude to ours about the undesirability of people
running around engaging in mass murder.

Q: And those countries are?

Rumsfeld: Well, time will tell, won't it?

(...)

Q: Could you expand a moment on what types of prisoners you think the United
States should be detaining? Are we talking about only people on the list of al
Qaeda leadership? Are we talking about foreign fighters? Could you expand --

Rumsfeld: Sure. Let me see if I can put them in some baskets for you. Anyone --
Taliban or al Qaeda -- who has information, intelligence information, that can
add to our knowledge about the terrorist network in Afghanistan or in
neighboring countries or anywhere on the face of the earth, we want. We want a
chance to talk to them, to interrogate them, to find out what they know; to find
out what the patterns and procedures and training approaches are of the various
organizations, and to learn every single thing we can. That's one category.

So that's very broad, very large numbers of people. We'd like to get our hands
on them, control them for a period, go through that intelligence gathering
process. It's enormously important, and it has been helpful already.

Second: We have less interest in the lower-level Taliban people, because they're
Afghans, and the people of Afghanistan are going to have to deal with them in
one way or another. With the senior level Taliban people, we are quite
interested. They are clearly closely connected to al Qaeda and have expressed
the same types of views, the same types of approaches, and they need to be
punished; they need to be taken care of in one manner or another by somebody.

They're mostly all Afghans, as the way I'd use the word "Taliban", and that
means that to the extent there are people -- a relatively small number of people
at the top that we would like to have control over, and not just for
intelligence but for disposition. There are lesser people that one would think
at some point the government of Afghanistan, as it gets its sea-legs, might very
well address.

With respect to al Qaeda, from the top to the bottom, they're bad folks. They
have been doing perfectly terrible things in Afghanistan and around the world,
and it would be just a crime if they are let loose in any way to go to the
neighboring countries or to other countries, our country, or anywhere in the
world to continue the terrorist acts that they've been engaged in. And so they
ought to be stopped and they ought to be imprisoned, and they ought not to be
permitted to do that.

Last, the senior al Qaeda leadership. Those are people that we obviously hope to
get control over and have a much -- a very deep involvement as to what their
ultimate disposition might be.

Q: Roughly how many people are in that last category?

Rumsfeld: I'm kind of not going to get into numbers. It's not hundreds.

Q: (Off mike.) (Laughter.)

Rumsfeld: (Laughs.) It's not hundreds or thousands.

Q: Could you clarify something you said earlier? You said, with regard to
capturing of these prisoners, "They will turn them over to us or they will not
be in positioned in places where they will come in contact with the people we
would like to have." Does that mean that the folks that are fighting alongside
the United States, whoever they are, over there, have formally agreed to hand
them over to the U.S., or is this like the arrangement with the Afghans whereby
everyone understands the personal force of General Franks and they're not likely
to cross him?

Rumsfeld: Well, I -- in my response, it was in the context of a question
relating to the European Union's no death penalty position. And I was not
referring to the Afghan forces on the ground.

Q: Right. I'm clear on that.

Rumsfeld: Okay.

Q: So --

Rumsfeld: Now. So what did I mean? What I meant was that if a country has a
sensitivity or a sensibility with respect to the death penalty, that's their
privilege. We just don't want it to get in our way with respect to the people
who fit in these senior-level categories. That means that either forces on the
ground or -- with whom we're cooperating or who might be involved in the
security force in Kabul would understand that idiosyncrasy on our part.

And they would agree either that they would not take control over people and
turn them over to us, or we would agree that they would not be put in proximity
where they might have occasion to take control over such people.

Q: That was a condition of involvement?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I wouldn't put it quite that way. But certainly --

(Cross talk.)

Q: Has Great Britain --

Q: How many -- how many -- (inaudible)? How many -- (inaudible.)

Rumsfeld: Well, that's the problem. It's not a matter of enforcing it. This is a
matter of discussion and working things out with reasonable people and friends
and --

Q: But given your lack of --

Q: Has the old U.S. ally Great Britain given an assurance that if it comes into
possession of Bin Laden it will turn him over to the United States?

Rumsfeld: When I first heard that this issue was being raised, I checked, and
the response we've received is not to worry. And I believe that they have made
public statements to that effect. But I have not seen them in writing, so it's
not for me to say whether they have or not, but I'm told they have. And I'm told
that regardless of whether they have said so publicly, it will not be an issue.

(...)

* * *


December 17, 2001

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - REAR ADM. STUFFLEBEEM (excerpt)

Q: If I could follow up, do you have an assessment of how many people have been
captured -- Taliban, al Qaeda? And can you explain the process of how you are
identifying these people, how they're being transported, either from Tora Bora
to Kandahar to the USS Peleliu? And what kind of determination are you making?
The fact that you have those four on board the Peleliu, does that indicate -- is
there a different point in this process or they're different kinds of prisoners?
Can you explain how you're actually doing this on the ground?

Stufflebeem: Well, only in very general terms for two reasons. One is that I
don't know the specific process. Some numbers that have been taken, and you can
infer this throughout the entire country, would be in the numbers of hundreds if
you added them all up, I think as a total number, and held predominantly by
opposition groups. Our forces are interrogating these detainees as they're being
held by opposition groups and determining whom of those we would like to
interrogate further. And then we work with the opposition leaders who have
detention of these individuals to ask for them to turn them over to us. I would
expect that that's probably an individual negotiation, and it could have
different outcomes wherever you are in the country doing that.

Once an opposition group leader has decided or determined that he'll turn over
an individual to the U.S. detainee, we then have facilities that are -- one was
built or erected down at Camp Rhino by the Marines. There is another one that is
being -- if not already up and operating -- at Kandahar airport under U.S.
control.

And so between the two of those, we have a capacity now to receive these
detainees, and we know that they're coming, as we are doing these interrogations
and getting access to these individuals and asking for this -- may we have
custody of this individual? -- and getting those.

And determining how you can tell who's who -- the Afghans can very easily
determine whom is an Afghan and whom is not, culturally, I think, as well as how
the individual physically looks. And certainly some who I think are probably
just honestly saying who they are, where they're from, and what they were there
for.

And so that process then takes those individuals -- we'll move them under
opposition group control in their vehicles until we can accept custody and move
them with our vehicles, and then take them to the closest facility where we
would want to do that. Upon further interrogation, then, we may -- or the
Central Command may want to move them, then, to the ships at sea.

Q: And beyond Walker, how was it determined that these four prisoners would be
aboard the USS Peleliu? Does that represent that they're any closer to being put
on trial or are they any more dangerous than the others? Are you dividing them
and organizing them based on which group they belong to, to which prison
facility?

Stufflebeem: I don't know the specifics of those four. Central Command
determines for either medical considerations, for the protection of those
individuals, for the isolation, in the sense of not having forces that would try
to come get somebody out of a detention center for security aspect, and
obviously an interest to continue interrogations. But the specifics of those
four I don't know.

* * *


December 18, 2001

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - DEPUTY SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ AND GEN. PACE (excerpts)

(...)

Q: There are reports there are now 18 prisoners in U.S. custody. Could you say
more about your interrogation plans for them -- what you expect, what you hope
to learn from them, how extensive this interrogation will be, how long it will
go on -- and then, beyond the interrogation, what plans would you have once you
get the information from them that you want?

Wolfowitz: Well, the first priority is to get information from them and, first
and foremost, information that can lead us to the capture of other terrorists,
and I would say, particularly, frankly, the capture of terrorists here in the
United States or in other places where they may be planning operations.

They're more likely to have immediate knowledge of people in Afghanistan, and,
obviously, we're looking for that information. And I think as long as we
continue to believe they have intelligence value, that will remain our priority.
But at some point, any number of them are going to have issues of judicial
punishment to be considered, and at some point, we'll have to consider under
what jurisdiction that applies.

Q: If I could --

Wolfowitz: But we're still a very long way from there, and it's a complicated
business, and you can't, you know -- someone said the other day, in commenting
on the terrorists who were arrested in connection with the Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam bombings, that these guys are very skilled liars. They lie shamelessly;
when you catch them out in a lie, they go on to another lie.

So that gives you -- this was speaking about some of the people we've convicted
for past terrorist acts. So I think that gives you an idea that this is not a
simple matter, you sit down and have an interview and then you dispose of the
information. And it's a reason also to keep each one of them guessing as to what
we've learned from someone else.

Q: If I could just follow up, we understood that there were about 3,000
prisoners that were being held by alliance forces west of Mazar-e Sharif, and
that 15 of those had been selected and are on their way to Kandahar. Can you
tell us what the significance of those 15 are? Do you believe that they have the
kind of information that you're looking for? Are they senior al Qaeda? How have
they been selected, or are they just the first bunch to go through this process?

Wolfowitz: There are 15 that are moving from Sherberghan to Kandahar. My
understanding, but General Pace may know better, is that they were selected
because they -- we concluded they, in conjunction with the people holding them,
that these were people who might have important information or might be
themselves senior people.

We've heard that number -- 3,000. There's no precise number. I would say,
probably, if you stuck to the figure "hundreds," you'd probably be closer to
what's accurate. But they're holding a lot of people up there, and we've made it
clear that where there's any reason to think that they're al Qaeda or senior
Taliban people that we would like to get our hands on them to interrogate them.

(...)

Q: Concerning John Walker, how much longer do you intend to hold him? His
attorney, his family attorney has said that his constitutional rights may be
violated by not being able to meet with an attorney. And also, do you have any
plans to turn him over to the Justice Department?

Wolfowitz: We're still considering what to do with him. There's no decision yet.

Q: Concerning John Walker, can you --

Q: On that topic, can you talk about the rules governing him? I mean, how long
can you hold him without letting him see his lawyer? And he's a detainee but
he's not a prisoner of war. What are the rules on that?

Wolfowitz: I think I'd probably ask general counsel to give you the exact rules,
but he is being held under -- he's being treated consistent with the Geneva
protections for prisoners of war. So he enjoys all the protections that would go
with prisoner of war status, but he is not a legal combatant, and therefore he's
not legally a prisoner of war.

Q: He's not a legal combatant. Does that mean that you believe that he is al
Qaeda and not a Taliban? How do you classify this man?

Wolfowitz: I don't want to make a judicial judgment here.

We know he was fighting in an area with Taliban/al Qaeda forces. That much I
know. Beyond that, I don't know how we would classify him legally.

Q: To what extent is he cooperating, and is he providing any information of
value in terms of the investigation into al Qaeda/Taliban leadership? Can you --
can you share --

Wolfowitz: I really don't know the current status.

Do you --

Pace: I do not.

Q: Mr. Secretary, when you talked about the prisoners being -- giving
information, but largely being second-hand, were you talking about sort of the
older group of prisoners from the north, the ones that are being transferred, or
were you talking about the prisoners, the Tora Bora prisoners, who I guess you
may have had some access but you do not have custody of?

Wolfowitz: I was specifically referring to the reports I had seen -- and
remember, these are preliminary reports -- for prisoners in the Tora Bora area.
Now, the people up north, I don't -- it's been a long time since any of them
have suggested --

Q: Even the Tora Bora prisoners you feel do not have very recent direct contact
--

Wolfowitz: No, what I'm saying is what they've told us so far that has gotten up
to me doesn't suggest recent knowledge. But on the other hand, somebody might be
sitting on recent knowledge and not telling us, or somebody down at the local
level may already be telling us things. As General Pace said, this is a
situation that changes every 15 minutes.

Q: Are the five being held on the Peleliu and the 15 being transferred from
Mazar, is that the total number of detainees now being held by the U.S.? Or do
you have a good total number?

Wolfowitz: That's correct.

Q: And so, it's 20.

Pace: It is right now. In a half-hour, it might be more than that.

(...)

* * *


December 27, 2001

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND GEN. MYERS (excerpt)

(...)

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you planning to use Guantanamo Bay as a place to hold
detainees and possibly to hold military tribunals there?

Rumsfeld: We are making preparations to hold detainees there. We have made no
plans to hold any kind of tribunal there.

(...)

Q: Mr. Secretary, we've gotten into trouble every time we've tried to use
Guantanamo Bay in the past to hold people, for other reasons. Why use it? Why is
it the best place? And are you concerned that we could have trouble with Castro
if we did?

Rumsfeld: We don't anticipate any trouble with Mr. Castro in that regard.

Q: Can you give us --

Rumsfeld: I would characterize Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as the least worst place we
could have selected. It has disadvantages, as you suggest. Its disadvantages,
however, seem to be modest relative to the alternatives.

Q: If you use it, do you know when we will -- the first prisoners would move
there?

Rumsfeld: Well, it wouldn't be ready for a number of weeks to handle the kinds
of people that we would very likely place there.

(...)

* * *


January 3, 2002

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND GEN. MYERS (excerpts)

Rumsfeld: Charlie?

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you going to start moving these detainees to Gitmo over
the next couple of days? And have you made any decision on the how, when, and
where of military court martials?

Rumsfeld: I spent some time over the holidays digging into those subjects, and
we are going to proceed with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a -- the base there -- as
a location for some detainees. They are in the process now of beginning the
construction so that we'll be able to provide the kind of security that these
people require. They are very hard cases for the most part. If you think what
happened in Mazar-e Sharif and the uprising in the prison, you think of the
number of Pakistani soldiers that were killed -- there have been three or four
incidents where these folks have demonstrated their determination to kill
themselves, kill others, and/or escape. So it is important that the facilities
be appropriate, and as soon as they're well enough along, we'll begin that
process.

Q: And -- excuse me -- and the how, when and where of military court martials?

Rumsfeld: Well, as I say, I --

Q: Might they -- (off mike) -- Gitmo?

Rumsfeld: I haven't addressed that particular question, as to where they would
be located with respect to a commission. I did spend a good deal of time
studying it and visiting with people about it, and we have a process in place
which, over the coming period, we'll -- I'm sure, well before anyone is assigned
to be tried by such a commission, we'll have completed the kinds of decisions
that are -- that need to be made.

(...)

Q: Getting back to the Guantanamo location for the detainees. You talked about
the need to construct facilities there that are adequate to hold them. But can
you discuss, please, the delicate, difficult problem of transporting them from
Afghanistan to there, and the --

Rumsfeld: It's a long way. It's one of the disadvantages of Guantanamo Bay. But
it has to be done very, very carefully. Every time people have messed with these
folks, they've gotten in trouble. And they are very well trained. They're very
hardened. They're willing to give up their lives, in many instances. I mean,
think of what's been going on in this hospital down there in Kandahar. So all we
can do is our best. And we plan to transport them and we plan to use the
necessary amount of constraint so that those individuals do not kill Americans
in transport or in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Yes?

Q: If I could follow up, sir, if I could follow up the question about whether
they would be accompanied by marshals, United States marshals, who have a
tremendous experience in that, with the military accompaniment, have you gone
into that and the considerations that might affect those decisions?

Rumsfeld: I have not addressed it, but my assumption is it will be done by
military personnel.

(...)

And then the quick follow-up I have is: On Guantanamo Bay, is that the only
place, the only military facility that the administration is now looking at
holding current or future detainees? Or is the administration considering any
activity at any other military bases for holding detainees, even future ones
that you may get?

Rumsfeld: We'll have to start backwards.

We do not have a good fix on what the total number of detainees will be.
Needless to say, our desire is to not have a lot. That is not what we're about
-- gathering up maximum numbers. We would like to make sure that the ones that
ought to be secured so they don't go out and kill more people are, in fact,
secured, and ones that need not be are not, and that, in every event, the
maximum amount of intelligence is extracted from them first.

In the event that Guantanamo proves to be inadequate from a size standpoint,
there are other places, obviously, that were considered, and while Guantanamo
was the "least worst," there are others on the list that might be the "next-
least worst."

Q: Do these include already considering military bases inside the United States
as possible holding facilities?

Rumsfeld: Certainly for certain types of detainees, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Q: Excuse me; I'm not done.

Can I ask you to articulate what kinds -- are these people that could possibly
provoke an attack, and they need to be in a very, very secure facility?

Are you constructing any facilities at military bases right now?

Rumsfeld: I don't think we'll need to. I don't think we'll have to do that. I
think we've got some facilities at U.S. military bases at the present time that
have vacancies, and -- (laughter) -- and we're looking -- we'll take full
advantage of those.

Yes?

Q: You know, an interesting follow up on that might be, is the U.S. military
prepared to carry out any possible executions of those who could be convicted by
a military tribunal?

Rumsfeld: Not an issue we've addressed.

Q: Is that a possibility, however? Would that be carried out by the Justice
Department or would that be carried out by the military?

Rumsfeld: This is not an issue I've addressed.

(...)

* * *


January 3, 2002

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - ASD PA CLARKE AND REAR ADM. STUFFLEBEEM (excerpts)

Stufflebeem: Thank you.

Good afternoon, everyone. Just a quick update on operations that continue in
Afghanistan. Focus continues on locating al Qaeda, Taliban and their leadership;
to interview detainees in Afghanistan for intelligence, and to prepare for their
transfer and detention at the Guantanamo Base facility; and to support
international humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan.

In Zhawar Kili, we found a number of tracked military vehicles and artillery
pieces after last week's strikes, and we have worked again to destroy them from
the air. At Khowst, we also found a small number of anti-aircraft weapons, and
used airstrikes yesterday to destroy those.

The number of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees transferred to U.S. forces in
Afghanistan continues to grow and the current number now stands at 346. There
are 300 in Kandahar, 21 at Bagram, 16 in Mazar-e Sharif, and nine on USS Bataan.
We expect to be able to begin transfer shortly of many of these detainees to the
facilities in Guantanamo Bay.

(...)

* * *


January 8, 2002

DOD NEWS BRIEFING - GEN. MYERS (excerpts)


The number of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees transferred to U.S. control
continues to grow and now stands at 364. There are 302 being held at Kandahar,
38 at Bagram, 16 at Mazar-e Sharif, and eight on the Bataan.

Now we'll take a look at that video clip of the F-14 strike yesterday at Zhawar
Kili. You can see some vehicles near the compound, as well as an individual
outside the targeted building. These were not friendly forces, and we had
evidence that the compound was active with al Qaeda.

(...)

Q: General, you said that there were eight on the Bataan. There had been nine.

What happened to the ninth? How are you going to transfer the detainees to Gitmo
-- by plane or ship or a combination? And secondly, what about John Walker? Is
he going to be taken down there or taken elsewhere?

Myers: There were nine. Interesting to see you keep these accurate tabs of our
detainees.

Q: We pay attention to them.

Myers: That's very good. (laughter) There were nine. There are now eight. One
was taken to -- I think we took him to Bagram airport because the interrogation
capabilities we have at Bagram are superior to what we have on board the ship,
and we wanted to conduct some specific interrogations. So we went there for the
better capability.

Q: Can you tell us who he was or who he is?

Myers: No. I'll just say that as the secretary has said on several occasions
here, we -- the Department of Defense will -- is working to release a list of
who we have, who we want -- who we have. There are clearly some intelligence
implications to that information, so it's taking some time to work through that.
But the secretary has promised he's going to try to release that and he's -- I
know we're working on it. We're all working on that. So I can't make any
promises when, but it -- he will fulfill that promise, I'm sure.

In terms of how we're going to transport them, it looks like initially we're
going to do this by plane, by aircraft. And those details are being worked by
Transportation Command and the appropriate agencies right now.

And in terms of Mr. Walker, I have no indications right now of where he's going
to go precisely.

Q: Is he still on the Bataan?

Myers: To the best of my knowledge, he is, in fact.

(...)

Q: General, on Kandahar, do you see the growing number of prisoners that you're
having there as a security force to U.S. forces? Is that part of why you seem to
be moving relatively quickly to Guantanamo? And has the military made any new
decisions about whom you will move first, including whether the first or next
batch of folks that you do move will be those subject to military tribunals?

Myers: Obviously, any time you have detainees who will sacrifice their life to
kill you or what you stand for, I mean, that's the most dangerous type of
individual you can have in your control. And so, with nearing 400 of those
individuals, or 300-plus now, 320- some, at Kandahar, it is. It's a security
issue you need to deal with. The folks at Kandahar are dealing with that
security issue and they take every means available.

The pace we're on to move to Guantanamo -- you said quickly -- it's on the pace
that we've tried to stay on. This has been something that's been in the works
for some time. And it's not any quicker or faster or slower than it ever was. We
want to make sure the facilities in Guantanamo Bay are adequate for the task.
And this is serious business. We've gotten help from experts in this business,
both our own military detention people who work this issue, and Bureau of
Prisons and so forth. So we're trying to make it ready in Guantanamo to start
relieving some of that pressure in Kandahar.

In terms of who first, yes, we know who first, and as far as I know, it has
nothing to do with tribunals or any of that. It's -- so I'll just leave it at
that. And I'm sure as we start to transfer people in this department --

Q: Well, when you make that, can you help us any more on how you would make that
transportation? Could who- first have to do with the intelligence you hope to
get from them?

Myers: No, I'll leave that to someone else because I've not been part of who-
first, how we pick the first ones, but that's something you might want to
address with the secretary later on.

Q: General Myers, may I go back to your taking of the two of great interest? I
wondered if you could elaborate as best you can in generalities. They were
terrorists. Were they people who might have been in close proximity to terrorist
leaders, who might have had, say, information on command and control? Can you
say just generally what you might have, and again just generally the information
that you might be gaining from that intelligence on computers, just generally?

Myers: I don't think there's much more I can offer than what I've said, except
that they are al Qaeda, as opposed to Taliban. So it -- they become very
interesting to us because they're a part of the worldwide network of terrorism
that al Qaeda supports.

And so we would hope to be gleaning, you know, information that might point to
future operations, other operations, so forth.

(cross talk)

Q: In general, why would you single out those two as opposed to the other 12? I
mean, can you say in general why you might choose these two as opposed to the
other 12 you didn't choose?

Myers: I think because -- (chuckles) -- I mean, not to be flippant at all,
because we thought they had -- they're the -- they were the types of individuals
-- and we had people looking at this that -- you know, that people make those
judgments on these people that we detain, and some just have more intelligence
value than others. And so you can't detain them all, so you pick the ones that
you think are going to be the most fruitful, and that's exactly what happened.

(cross talk) Yes, sir?

Q: General, to follow up on that, though -- just to follow up, could you give us
some sort of context as to what sort -- are we getting any intelligence out of
some of these prisoners? Are we getting none? Some? Are we --

Myers: We've -- I mean, we said before -- last time I was up here we talked -- I
think we've talked about it at least twice the last two times I was up here with
the secretary -- that indeed we are getting some intelligence on this. We think
we have thwarted some attacks. But to go into any more detail starts to give
away what we know and what they don't know we know, and so we've got to be very,
very careful there. But yes, this has been somewhat fruitful.

(...)


Q: General, can you give us a more precise idea of what you mean when you say
that "transfers to Guantanamo will begin soon"? And also, could you tell us --
my understanding is, there are cells there now for about 50 prisoners already on
the base. Is that the initial limit on what you'll transfer, or are you going to
set up tent camps until you have more additional permanent facilities?

Myers: I'm going to leave it at "soon." "Soon" is -- "soon" is about as good as
good as I'm going to -- can do because, as I said before, we've got to ensure
that the facilities on Guantanamo are sufficient to hold the type of detainees
that we're going to hold. And it's obviously -- it's got to be done right. So
there is no pressure on Southern Command, in this case, who is responsible for
this activity -- there's no pressure on them or the Joint Task Force that's
going to be conducting activities in this camp to hurry this along.

And the number of cells you talked about is close to being right, but we're
going to bring cells on, it looks like, fairly quickly, and they will not be of
the same variety in Kandahar. They will not be -- they'll be a more -- more
permanent type -- I hate to use the word "permanent" -- but they're not going to
be tents. They're going to be secure facilities that will be brought online, and
they will not be temporary in the sense that we're going to replace them right
away. Now in the long run, they may give way to other structures, but they're
going to be good for the foreseeable future. Okay.

(...)

* * *
* * *
* * *