Here's a question I asked some of the journalists on the PEGC distribution list after reading Rumsfeld's briefing for 1/13/2004: I have a question for you. In yesterday's DoD press conference, Rumsfeld stated: Q: Mr. Secretary, when Saddam Hussein was captured, it was said that he was talkative, but not particularly forthcoming, and in fact, somewhat defiant. In the month since his capture, has he provided U.S. interrogators with any useful information about WMD [weapons of mass destruction], the insurgency or anything else in regard to his regime? And what was behind the decision by the Pentagon to declare him a prisoner of war? And does that in any way tie the U.S. administration's hands in turning him over to the Iraqis eventually? SEC. RUMSFELD: Wow. First of all, I'm not going to characterize his interrogations. It seems to me that he's a very high-value person in terms of intelligence, and we've asked the Central Intelligence Agency to manage the interrogations. They're doing it. They're doing a good job. And how we characterize what he said or what he has done or what value there has been, it seems to me I have asked George to do, and he's doing it. And we'll leave it there. The second part of your question, on the EPW [enemy prisoner of war] issue, let me -- I have commented on this a couple of times, and I think my comments will be pretty much the same, that there are technical legal issues involved here. The policy people make the decisions, and the legal interagency group has been, obviously, thinking this through. And if you think about Saddam Hussein's circumstance, the -- he had a potential to be prosecuted for activities against the Iraqi people. He has a potential to be prosecuted for his actions against the Kuwaiti people. He has a potential for being prosecuted against the Iranian people -- for his actions against the Iranian people, where he used gas. He has -- he is, as a military person, an enemy prisoner of war for the period up to May 1st. And he has the potential for being prosecuted for activities after May 1st involving the insurgency and the killing of coalition troops. What the announcement has been, as I understand it, by the lawyers -- or a conclusion by the lawyers -- and I do not know myself whether it has been addressed at the policy level, but the lawyers have concluded -- probably properly, I assume properly, that he should be characterized as an EPW, enemy prisoner of war. Now -- full stop. However, his status can be reviewed at any time, more than once. And so as additional information or as decisions are made, that may be either changed or amplified. But at the moment, you know, he is, I believe, being characterized as an enemy prisoner of war. The third part of your question is could that in any way affect the possibility of the Iraqis being involved in his trial or his prosecution, and the answer is no. I mean, the reality is that the president has said, and the decision has been made, that he believes the Iraqi people need to be involved in that process in whatever way is ultimately decided. Note: "the legal interagency group". I'm not sure I've ever heard that phrase before (Rumsfeld usually just says "the lawyers"), but then my focus is very narrow by necessity, so maybe I'm missing something... Yet I've been thinking there was such a group for a long time... strictly by inference. It's got to include the White House, DoD, DOJ, and CIA minimum I figure, and the group of experts they consulted about the "military commissions" (Wedgwood et al) has to be hooked into it. My question is: what, if anything, is known about it? That got no responses, and the topic might appear trivial. From my perspective, it's the key element of the conspiracy to violate 18 USC 2441. On 1/14/2004 a number of briefs were filed in Al Odah and Rasul. Reading through them the next day, something turned up. Al Odah merits brief at 8: That was the purpose here. A recently released paper makes clear that the government selected Guantanamo as its prison site largely to avoid court review of its actions. 7 [ http://www.nimj.org/documents/Al_Odah_Petrs_Brief_on_Merits.pdf ] And in footnote 7, BINGO: 7 See Col. Daniel F. McCallum, Why GTMO? (hereinafter "McCallum, Why GTMO?") at 6, available at the website of the National War College, http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/writing/AY03/5603/5603G.pdf (visited Jan. 9, 2004). The paper doesn't go very deep, but it's start. I figure there's lot more there -- I think they're coordinating legal policy generally. It's a lot like how they do PR: a calculated public front masking all the operational schemes and agendas. And today the Post and Fox are reporting they are getting ready to put Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on trial in a kangaroo court at Gitmo -- I find that very interesting in the context of recent developments in the habeas cases, Moussaoui, and the elections. It's all so utterly phony and contrived. Charly ================================================================================ GONZALES, ALBERT - White House Legal Counsel ADDINGTON, DAVID S. - Counsel to the Vice President COMEY, JAMES B JR - US Deputy AG (US Atty Southern NY to 2003.11) OLSON, THEODORE B - US Solicitor General CLEMENT, PAUL D - Deputy US Solicitor General HOWARD, ROSCOE - US Atty DC MCNULTY, PAUL J - US Atty Eastern VA KELLEY, DAVID - US Atty Southern NY HAYNES, WILLIAM J - DoD General Counsel ALLEN, CHARLES - DoD Deputy General Counsel (Legal Counsel) COBB, WHIT - DoD Deputy General Counsel (DGC) PROSPER, W. P-R. - Ambassador-at-large (War Crimes), State Dept CIA NSC VP